



Deficit of Trust in Pakistan-Afghanistan Bilateral Relations: An Evaluation from a Security and Economic Perspective from 2001 to 2021

Sher Bano

Department of Political Science
Qurtuba University of Science and
Information Technology, Dera Ismail
Khan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan
Email: esherbano2020@gmail.com

Dr. Zafar Abbas

Department of Political Science,
Government College No.1 Dera Ismail
Khan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan
Email: zafarabbas2004@gmail.com

Citation

Bano, S., & Abbass, Z.. (2024). Deficit of trust in Pakistan-Afghanistan bilateral relations: An evaluation from a security and economic perspective from 2002 to 2021. *Open Access Organization and Management Review*, 2(2): 1-9.

WEBSITE: www.mdPIP.com

PUBLISHER: MDPIP

ISSN: Print: 2959-6211

ISSN: Online: 2959-622X

ABSTRACT:

At the crossroads of Central and Southern Asia lie two Muslim neighbors i.e., Pakistan and Afghanistan. Similarities in religion, culture, ethnicity, race, and history were predicted to cement the harmonious bilateral connection between the two countries. There have been a lot of obstacles to the development of positive relations between the two republics ever since they were established. Afghanistan's alone neighbor and a key commercial partner, Pakistan and the two countries have a difficult history despite Afghanistan's reliance on Pakistan's seaports and international trade. Tense relations began with the conflicts over the Durand line and Pakhtunistan stunt supported by Afghan government and were exacerbated by subsequent events like the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the American involvement in the country after September 11, 2001. A large number of refugees fled to Pakistan as a result of these invasions, shaking up the country's politics and economy. India's involvement in Afghan politics has had a major effect on Pakistan's interests in the country and the surrounding region, especially after September 11th, when the United States attempted to offset Chinese influence in the area. India's engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan's support in the US invasion of Afghanistan are at the root of the current state of bilateral ties. Normalizing bilateral relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan may require the involvement of a third party or agreement on confidence-building measures to enhance the welfare of persons living on the other side of the Durand line and encourage amicable interactions between the two countries. Using a qualitative approach, this article investigates the causes and consequences of the current mistrust in bilateral ties, with a particular emphasis on economic and security problems in the wake of 9/11.

Keywords: Bi-Lateral Relations, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Trust Deficit, Trade and Cultural Exchange.

This is an open access article distributed under the terms of [Creative Commons Attribution License \(CC BY\)](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).



Reproduction, distribution, and use in other forums are permitted provided the copyright owner (s), the original authors are credited, and the original publication is cited.



Introduction

The continent of Asia is located to Afghanistan's east, and it is made up of the countries of South Asia. It shares borders with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to the west, Tajikistan and China to the north, and Iran and the rest of West Asia to the south. Since Central Asia has large energy resources and South Asian republics are overpopulated and energy-starved, understanding Afghanistan's function as a connecting point between South Asia, West Asia, and Central Asia is crucial. While trade and cultural exchange between Central Asia and South Asia could be mutually beneficial, neither region is now equipped to take advantage of the many possibilities that exist between them due to inadequate transportation and communication links. On the other hand, due to its strategic location, Afghanistan stands to gain a great lot economically from trade and transit, which may be used to help the country grow, expand, and prosper. The international community has made recent attempts to take advantage of these openings, but their efforts have yielded only modest gains (Khan & Shirazi, 2021). Pakistan's territorial conflicts with Afghanistan and India date back to its 1947 independence from the British. In particular, Afghanistan's differences with Pakistan over the Durand Line and Pakhtunistan led to Kabul's decision to veto Pakistan's UN membership. In an effort to mend fences with the USA, Pakistan played a key role in the US's decade-long proxy war against the Soviets in Afghanistan (Ahmed, 2012). After 2001, Pakistan's longstanding ties to the Taliban made its contribution to Afghanistan's stability stand out as more crucial and essential than ever before. Nevertheless, mistrust between Afghanistan and Pakistan's governing bodies has obscured much of Pakistan's position in peace efforts. Distrust characterizes the bilateral relationship between the two countries (Usman & Khan, 2017).

Several factors have contributed to the deterioration of trust between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Notwithstanding the fact that the Durand Line and Pakhtunistan have always been the cause of unrest, claims of cross-border terrorism have recently gained prominence (Khan, 2017). Qassem (2007) argues that "an important reason for the continuing instability lies in the fact that the international effort has failed to address longstanding disagreements between Afghanistan and Pakistan - the Durand Line border dispute and the Pakhtunistan issue," even though allegations of cross-border terrorism have taken center stage in bilateral relations. Pakistan is worried about India's increasing influence in Afghanistan (Ahmed & Bhatnagar, 2015). Because of their political disagreements, Pakistan and Afghanistan have missed out on valuable opportunities for bilateral and regional cooperation. Given the rise of Chinese investment and the aspirations of energy-rich Central Asian Republics to export natural gas to South Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan may want to reevaluate the benefits and drawbacks of their abundant options for bilateral and multilateral collaboration (Ahmed & Bhatnagar, 2018). The research aims to clarify the complexities of the collaboration and conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan at both the bilateral and multilateral levels.

Many studies by political scientists have focused on the origins of the conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan (Rais, 2019). Since 2001, experts in the field have largely focused on Pakistan's security problems and India's growing influence in Afghanistan. For examples, see (Zeb, 2013) and (Taye & Ahmed, 2021). The Taliban factor has also been considered because of its obvious significance to the stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as to their interactions with one another (Akhtar, 2008). The literature on Afghanistan and Pakistani relations tends to focus on the differences between the two countries rather than the commonalities. According to Javaid's (2016) investigation, this approach only considers the past and present dynamics, not bilateral and external elements that can affect relationships. Some research has looked at how better trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan could improve relations between the two countries Zingel (2014). The role that customary conflict settlement methods and other forms of cultural similarity can have in strengthening bilateral ties has also been examined (Ahmed & Yousaf, 2018). Yet, the existing literature lacks a comprehensive appraisal of major potential for bilateral and multilateral collaboration. It is argued that this two-level study is significant due to the divergent results. Using trust theory as a lens, this essay will analyze the state of affairs between Afghanistan and Pakistan. One cannot ignore the importance of relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It affects Pakistan's relations with its neighbors and endangers the security and stability of the country. The relationship between the two countries was characterized by a great deal of mistrust from 2001 to 2021. Because cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan is less likely, their bilateral relations have been more conflictual than cooperative during the time in question. However, in multilateral situations, confidence rises primarily as a result of the involvement of other parties, particularly hegemony. The biggest barrier to normalizing relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan is mistrust, which also prevents the two countries from having meaningful conversations and prevents cooperation on a number of fronts. The purpose of this article is to identify the root causes

and contributing elements of the mistrust that exists between Afghanistan and Pakistan regarding their ability to cooperate on economic and security issues. Therefore, the primary goal of the study is to look into and provide answers to the following questions. Why do relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan in terms of security continue to be less cooperative and more combative? What causes mistrust between two nations when they cooperate bilaterally on economic matters? What steps or changes in policy are necessary to foster trust between Pakistan and Afghanistan?

Literature Review

Gamba (2009) claims that the 2,430 kilometer border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is a source of tension between the two countries. Abdur Rahman Khan, the king of Afghanistan at the time, and Sir Mortimer Durand, the British Indian secretary, drew the Durand Line in 1893. Afghan officials said years later that the Durand Line was drawn arbitrarily, permanently dividing Pashtuns along the border, and was enforced at the time by an incompetent Afghan king. During the partition of the Indian Subcontinent, the Afghan government proposed renegotiating the Durand Line. This was rejected by the British authority. When Pakistan first appeared on the international stage as a sovereign nation in August 1947, Afghanistan was the only member of the United Nations to vote against admitting it. Since then, no Afghan government has recognized the Durand Line as an international boundary, which has strained bilateral relations. The Taliban, who ruled Pakistan peacefully from 1996 to 2001, also ignored it (Jamal & Bangash, 2016).

The boundary dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan has caused a number of difficult issues. Although Afghanistan was the only Muslim country that did not recognize Pakistan's independence when it was declared on August 14, 1947, Pakistan maintains friendly relations with a large number of other Muslim nations. The Durand Line, the border between the two nations, separated them by 2,430 kilometers. This boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan was set in 1893 after talks between Afghan Amir Abdul Rehman Khan and British Indian Prime Minister Mortimer Durand. The seven articles of this agreement fit neatly onto a single sheet of paper. Under the terms of this agreement, neither nation could interfere in the internal affairs of the other. As a result of this pact, the British began constructing a railway network on their side, which the Afridi tribes considered unacceptable and which eventually led to the beginning of problems for the British along the Durand Line (Gamba, 2009).

According to Zeb, the Durand Line became an internationally recognized border between Afghanistan and Pakistan in 1947, the year of Pakistan's independence (2013). In spite of this assertion, Afghanistan has firmly denied it, stating that it and British India have already addressed their boundary issue. The Durand Line between Pakistan and Afghanistan is no longer recognized as a border now that British India has been defeated. An extended Afghan border with Pakistan aims to encompass the Pashtun-dominated region of Baluchistan and the Indus River. The Durrani Empire was founded by Ahmad Shah Durrani, who maintained control over all of the regions that Afghanistan now seeks to absorb. As of 1747, Afghanistan was ruled by Ahmad Shah Durrani, also known as Ahmad Shah Abdali. As a result, Kabul categorically rejected the Durand line as the de facto border between its country and Pakistan. Afghanistan had asked the British to let the Pashtun people to establish their own independent Pathan state as they were leaving India in 1947, but the British government refused. Pakhtunistan independence groups sprang up in Afghanistan after this. The Pashtuns argued that if British India is split into Pakistan and India, then there must be another partition to ensure the freedom of the Pathans. These were the justifications behind Afghanistan's refusal to acknowledge Pakistan's independence and the Durand Line as an international border. Aware that accepting the Durand Line would lead to the separation of 50 million Pashtuns, the Afghan government came under heavy criticism (Zeb, 2013). Afghanistan, according to Omrani (2009), began an insurgency against Pakistan along the Durand Line and supported a separatist movement with the help of India and Russia when its attempt to establish a separate Pakhtunistan failed. Afghanistan also backed Mirzali Khan, a Pashtun tribal chieftain and proponent of an independent Pakhtunistan, in an effort to destabilize Pakistan. Khan was in favor of Pakhtunistan achieving its independence. The result has been difficult relations between the two countries ever since 1947, when Afghanistan flatly refused Pakistan's application to join the United Nations. After gaining independence, Pakistan hoped to maintain cordial relations with Afghanistan. But, Afghanistan used the airwaves and newspapers to incite violence against Pakistan. On May 1st, 1948, Pakistan appointed Mr. I. I. Chundrigar as ambassador to Afghanistan in an effort to normalize ties. For the "Jashan-e-Azadi" festivities in Afghanistan, Pakistan also sent a delegation led by Sardar Abdul Rab



Nishtar. In addition, it attempted to promote mutual confidence by withdrawing its troops from tribal regions; however, Afghanistan did not react well to this. The Afghan government employed several measures to destabilize Pakistan, including the king's anti-Pakistan address in parliament, the distribution of anti-Pakistan leaflets by the Afghan air force, the creation of a Pashtun parliament in Pakistan's tribal regions, and the use of irregular forces. In 1949, when tensions along the border were high because of Mirzali Khan, the Pakistani air force bombed insurgent camps in the border regions, which were receiving support from Afghanistan. Both countries pulled back their ambassadors because of the deteriorating relationship between them. Since Said Akbar Khan Barakzai, an Afghan national, was convicted of murdering Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan's first prime minister, in Rawalpindi in 1951, tensions between the two nations have been high. Omrani, 2009.

In a tract issued in 1952, Latif (2018) claims the Afghan government falsely claimed that Pakistani Baluchistan was a part of Afghanistan. Because to the damage done by this tract, diplomatic relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan deteriorated significantly. In 1953, Sardar Dad secretly ousted King Zahir Shah and assumed power in Afghanistan. Sardar Dad supported the Pakhtunistan movement, but Pakistan was against the change in leadership. As a result, there was a lot of misinformation on both sides, and tensions ran high. The United States provided Pakistan with military aid since it was an ally in the Cold War struggle against Communism. However, Afghanistan joined India in asking the US not to provide military aid to Pakistan, citing concerns for the safety of the former. In 1954 and 1955, Pakistan joined SEATO and CENTO, respectively, which strained relations between the two countries. Afghanistan was concerned that a powerful Pakistan would pose a threat to its own safety (Latif, 2018). Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra of Pakistan reportedly initiated the One Unit Initiative on November 22, 1954, as reported by Jamal & Bangash (2016). As a result of this proposal, Pakistan would have administrative control over all of East and West Pakistan save for a thousand-mile stretch. This plan would have made all of Pakistan's western regions into a single province called "west," while the country's eastern regions would have been split off and given their own names. The Afghan government strongly condemned the Pashtuns' decision to merge. Afterward, Afghan forces attacked and looted the Pakistani consulate in Jalalabad, Kandahar, and desecrated the Pakistani flag at the embassy in Kabul. In retaliation, Pakistani nationals stormed the Afghan embassy in Peshawar, and the Pakistani government restricted Afghan imports. As a result, ties between the two countries worsened during this time; however, this decline did not endure for very long, and they eventually improved. Hence, in 1955, both the Pakistani and Afghan consulates in Peshawar flew their own flags (Jamal & Bangash, 2016).

According to Miankhel (2015), Pakistan and Afghanistan decided to strengthen their ties in 1956, which prompted Iskandar Mirza, the president of Pakistan, to make a historic trip to Afghanistan in 1956, and Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, the prime minister of Pakistan, to travel to Afghanistan the following year, in 1957. Both presidents made an effort to improve relations between the two countries and end hostility during these trips. The Afghan government responded more successfully at the time. King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan made a historic journey to Pakistan in 1958, as did Afghanistan's prime minister in 1959. Although there were still many issues to be handled, these tours had a significant positive impact on Pakistan-Afghanistan relations (Miankhel, 2015). Ross & Vassefi (2015) state that between 1949 and 1961, relations between the two countries strengthened rapidly. As early as 1961, Afghanistan resumed its attacks against the Durand Line. Since ties between the two countries were at an all-time low, their consulates in each other's country were closed. As a result, Afghanistan shifted its focus from transit trade with Pakistan to direct trade with the Soviet Union. Due to the U-2 incident in 1960, the Soviet Union sided with Afghanistan against Pakistan (Ross & Vassefi, 2015). Grawert (2017) claims that in 1961, Afghanistan sent a group of Afghan tribesmen to Pakistan in an effort to cause trouble there. The degree of cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan hit rock bottom as a result. After the bilateral trade stopped, the consulates of both countries in the other country were closed. At this time, mutual confidence had deteriorated, but after intervention from the United States and Iran, the two countries were able to sit down and talk out their disagreements and resume trading with one another.

Mistrust in Bilateral Relations Between Pakistan and Afghanistan

Because of this mistrust, bilateral relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan were doomed from the start. When Pakistan was first created as an Islamic neighboring state, the government of Afghanistan at the time was opposed to its membership in the United Nations and refused to recognize it until the Durand Line boundary dispute was settled.



The Afghan government does not accept the Durand Line as Pakistan's international border, and Afghan claims extend to the Pashtun regions of Pakistan (the Tribal territories and other Pashtun-dominant portions of the then NWFP, now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). The Red Shirts, political allies of the Indian National Congress, formed the coalition government in what was then the NWFP but is now the KP. Voters in the NWFP were given the opportunity to choose between joining India and Pakistan in a referendum that sidestepped the province government, prompting the Red Shirts to boycott the vote. On June 21, 1947, the Bannu resolution was passed by the provincial Congress and the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement, advocating that Pakhtunistan remain an independent nation separate from India and Pakistan. The government of Britain turned down this request. After the vote in July 1947, the NWFP and the tribal belt were supposed to become a part of the new Pakistani dominion. Despite the fact that these two Muslim countries share a common language, culture, ethnicity, genealogy, and religion, their ties have deteriorated to the point of being hostile. Hence, the Afghan government has never acknowledged the Durand line as the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This distrust impeded the two countries' relationships in every sphere, and goodwill between them has never persisted for more than a limited window of time. Pakistan and Afghanistan both claim that the other is aiding and abetting terrorists who are their agents and working to undermine their own security. Pakistan's cooperation with the United States and its allies in the battle against terrorism has also angered the Afghan government and people. Afghanistan made an attempt to keep good relations with India after 9/11, even going so far as to occasionally prefer India to Pakistan in matters of defense and strategy. Similarly, under Ashraf Ghani's administration, Afghanistan's economic ties with Pakistan have weakened while those with India have strengthened. Afghanistan's invitation to India to train the Afghan National Army was detrimental to Pakistan's interests. The Afghan government has repeatedly requested that Pakistan open the Wagha Border to Afghan cargo trucks traveling to and from India.

Usman & Khan (2017) talked on how Pakistan and Afghanistan have a lot of mistrust for one another when it comes to terrorism and counterterrorism. Their capacity to cooperate on security concerns is constrained by competing allegations of cross-border terrorism between the two nations. Since President Ashraf Ghani entered office in September 2014, when the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding to target terrorist safe havens in both countries, there has been some improvement in the cooperation between Kabul and Islamabad on counterterrorism. Yet the counterterrorism cooperation was derailed by Kabul's direct claims of Pakistan's assistance in terrorist attacks on Afghanistan in August 2015. Cooperation in counterterrorism measures has been impeded by mutual mistrust, with one side blaming the other for terrorist attacks on its own soil.

Economic Perspective of Pak Afghan Relations after 9/11

As a landlocked country, Afghanistan has no easy way to reach the sea. Both of Afghanistan's landlocked neighbors to the north and west are themselves landlocked. Iran in the south and Pakistan in the east are the only countries with access to the warm waters. The Islamic Republic of Iran has been subject to international sanctions ever since the revolution of 1979. Hence, Afghanistan's economic efforts and trade with the rest of the world are dependent on Pakistan, the only country with seaports. Afghanistan relies on Pakistan for sea trade, but also for food, medical care, schools, and pretty much everything else it needs to survive. Members of the same Pashtun tribe now live on both sides of the border, further connecting Afghanistan and Pakistan, as a result of the Durand line. Nonetheless, despite these commonalities, the economic relationship between the two countries has not been promising since 9/11. Pakistan was one of just three countries in 1997 to officially recognize the Taliban-run Emirates of Islamic Afghanistan. At the fall of the Taliban, when Hamid Karzai took leadership of Afghanistan and Pakistan became a non-NATO ally and front-line state in the War on Terror, commercial relations between the two countries deteriorated. Thus, instead of buying wheat from Pakistan, Afghanistan has turned to India. A number of Afghan students and patients were granted visas by India to visit its hospitals and clinics. Trade between the two nations hit a new low in President Ghani's final years in office, when India significantly increased her influence in Afghanistan and worked to render Pakistan irrelevant in Afghan politics. The Financial Times, 2018.

It is Pakistan's strategic location, which makes it difficult to ignore and neglect. Pakistan recently approached the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan to acquire coal in an effort to save money, which has had a variety of impacts on Pak-Afghan relations from an economic standpoint. Sadly, after Pakistan contacted the Taliban, they agreed to triple coal's price. The Taliban regime has forgotten how this agreement may aid Afghans in overcoming their country's economic hardship and isolation from the rest of the world. The exports have offered some suggestions for ways to



boost bilateral trade between the two countries, including easing investor visa requirements, lowering border barriers for goods transport, calming down the security situation, putting an end to finger-pointing, stopping cross-border terrorism, taking into account confidence-building measures from an economic standpoint, lowering customs duties on seaports, renewing trade transit agreements, and stopping the smuggling of food and other items. The two countries' strong and vibrant economic ties are essential for both Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is claimed that neighbors cannot be changed, but friends can, and this is certainly true of Afghanistan and Pakistan. If neither state could escape the other's, then both nations would have to come up with novel solutions to the unresolved issues that had been impeding bilateral trade Akhtar (2008).

Security Perspective of Bilateral Relations Between Pakistan and Afghanistan

Pakistan and Afghanistan are geographically close. Foreign invaders have a long history of targeting Afghanistan. Recently, both the Soviet Union in 1979 and the United States after 9/11 attacked Afghanistan. Afghan warlords have both started and contributed to external conflicts that have harmed the Afghan people. The 2240 kilometers of common border between the two countries is widely recognized as one of the most convoluted borders in the world. At the time the border was created, the area was shared by people with similar tribal affiliations, and so it was divided into two states. Because the international boundary lines run across mountainous terrain, protecting the border can be difficult. Militant groups have used Afghanistan as a safe haven since the Soviet invasion, when jihadis flocked there from all over the world seeking refuge. The Soviet Union and the United States invading Afghanistan resulted in a significant influx of Afghan refugees, notably into Pakistan. This caused a number of problems for Pakistan and worsened relations between the two countries (Ahmed, 2012).

The US and other western nations created militant groups in Afghanistan and gave them weapons and ammunition to fight the USSR there. Because to its proximity to Afghanistan, Pakistan was taken prisoner by these organizations, which gave rise to the "Kalashnikov Culture" and "Heroin Culture" there. As a result, both the tribal regions of Pakistan and other areas of Pakistan as a whole were negatively impacted. The beginning of militant activity in Pakistan led to the worst kind of warfare, which the Pakistani government and military had to combat with their limited resources. After 9/11, when the US invaded Afghanistan for a second time, militant organizations that had fled the country to avoid attack by the US and her NATO allies once more turned their attention to Pakistan. Once more, they began their violent actions in Pakistan, particularly in the former FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Pakistan had to bear the burden of being a non-NATO ally in the War against Terror (WOT). The entire social structure, economic situation, foreign relations, and internal turmoil in Pakistan were severely damaged by this militancy. Due to several military operations around the nation, particularly in KP, FATA, and Baluchistan, the economy of Pakistan was destroyed, and the country once more sank into the dark ages (Khan, 2003). Pakistan endured a lot of pain during the War on Terror, but at the same time, the United States accused it of playing a double game and demanded that it "Do More" to put an end to militancy. Afghans did not like Pakistan either, despite the fact that Pakistan had saved their lives and given them refuge for the past 40 years. Although the Afghan situation has badly harmed Pakistan, the country has not shown its loyalty to the Afghan people or its sincerity in demanding friendly bilateral relations (Ahmed, 2018).

Method

The most widely applied and well-liked research philosophy in social science today is post-positivism. Each and every philosophy offers a definition of knowledge, along with methods and tools for acquiring, preserving, and disseminating knowledge (Collis & Hussey, 2003). Most issues in the state and between states are covered by political science. Some of these are tangible while others are intangible in nature (McNabb, 2005). The researcher has applied the post-positivist school of thought while taking into account the nature of the issue. Additionally, a qualitative approach has been used in accordance with the article's nature. In order to complete this study, the authors gathered data from secondary sources, such as books, articles, journals, newspapers, and research papers. Authors have used the Neuman-elaborated thematic analysis strategy of data analysis as a more suitable qualitative data analysis tool (2012).

Conclusions

Relationships between the two nations have seen several highs and lows since 1947. Despite many commonalities, such as a common faith, historical background, etc., diplomatic relations between the two countries remain strained. As diplomatic ties between the two countries were cut before the tour began, there was a palpable air of suspicion between the two delegations. There have been few instances of cooperation between the two states, but when they have occurred, they have usually been cordial. There have been two major incidents in the 75 years of bilateral relations that have had a lasting effect on the relationship between the two countries and their foreign policies. It was the United States' military participation in Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks and the Soviet invasion. Two separate foreign invasions of Afghan territory required Pakistan's participation. In 1979, when the former USSR attacked Afghanistan and landed there to save its puppet on the throne in Kabul, Pakistan was to play a crucial role in the containment of the USSR and pushed the USSR to leave Afghanistan with the help of the US and her allies. An extra 9/11-style event that sent shockwaves around the globe. With Pakistan's initiative in the war on terror, the United States officially recognized Pakistan as its first non-NATO ally. It's important to recall that Pakistan was one of just three nations in 1997 to officially recognize the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Even the Taliban leadership refused to acknowledge the Durand line as Pakistan's genuine frontier, therefore the acknowledgment did little to warm up relations between the two countries.

The 9/11 tragedy and Pakistan's role in it have the potential to mark a turning point in bilateral relations, particularly in terms of economic ties and security issues. As there is now a culture of mistrust between the two nations, there is less cooperation between them. Afghanistan used to be a bigger trading partner, but the two countries now have friendly trade ties. Afghanistan is searching for the Chahbahar Port in Iran, which India plans to build so that Afghanistan and India can expand their respective economies. Also, the trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan has been interrupted due to the border dispute and security concerns. Today, the need for a visa and both states' demeaning treatment of border traders and commodities carriers have become routine. This is the reason why Afghan traders now find it simple to conduct business via air with India rather than directly via road with Pakistan. The 9/11 catastrophe severely impacted Pakistan and Afghanistan's capacity to cooperate strategically and in terms of security, as well as their ability to repair their strained economic connections. As a frontline state in the global war on terror, with Afghan territory as the main theater of conflict, Pakistan suffered significantly from terrorism and extremism both within the country and from foreign actors. There have been over forty thousand fatalities and one hundred thousand injuries in Pakistan. The entire Pakhtun belt has been thrown into disarray due to terrorism, in which most Afghans have played a role, if only indirectly. The Afghan government was alerted multiple times of the terrorists' intentions to plan and coordinate their attacks against Pakistan from Afghan territory, but it ignored the warnings. The primary causes of distrust in bilateral ties, focusing on economic and security issues, that are the Durand Line, a contentious border that has persisted for decades. The United States and India's engagement in Afghanistan. Regional politics with the United States and China at the helm. India's expanding strategic importance in Afghanistan. The stance taken by US-backed Afghan rulers toward Pakistan. The historic Afghan stance towards Pakistan. Terrorist actions in Pakistan, backed by India and Afghanistan, are the seventh cause for concern. To counter Pakistan, Afghanistan has offered India a piece of land. Pakistan's part in the US-backed fight on terror. Pakistani military and logistical support for the United States. The Tehreek e Taliban of Pakistan and their safe haven in Afghanistan, and the Taliban retook control of Afghanistan not too long ago, in August of 2021.

Recommendations

The following CBMs could be maintained for the benefit of both Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to improve bilateral relations and eliminate mistrust.

1. Resolving the border dispute in accordance with the customs and standards established by international law.
2. None of the states should sell its own land to another nation in retaliation for the other state.
3. Both parties should prioritize their trade relations and the wellbeing of the residents of both sides of the Durand Line.
4. Cultural exchange between the two states ought to occur.

5. Pakistani colleges and universities ought to offer possibilities to Afghan students.
6. Both governments should process investor and business visa applications efficiently.
7. Pakistan should provide Afghanistan access to its own land and sea for international trade.
8. There should be no safe havens for terrorists or non-state actors, and terrorism should never be permitted in any form.
9. The border fence should be approved by both governments.
10. The Pakistani government should help refugees safely return to their country and follow established procedures for dealing with the refugee crisis.
11. Every dispute that developed out of bilateral relations should be taken to an international body, as stated in point
12. There should be involvement from regional and international organizations in fostering stronger bilateral connections.
13. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan should promote multilateral initiatives in economic, energy, political, geopolitical, and other complex areas.

Deceleration of Interest

The authors declare that there was no clash of interest.

References

- Ahmed, K. (2018, 4 March). Pak-Afghan trade volume declines as India increases its share. *Arab News*. Retrieved from <https://www.arabnews.pk/node/1258991/pakistan>
- Ahmed, Z. S. (2012). Political Islam, the Jamaat-e-Islami and Pakistan's role in the Afghan-Soviet War, 1979–1988. In P. E. Muehlenbeck (Ed.), *Religion and the Cold War: A global perspective* (pp. 275–298). Vanderbilt University Press.
- Ahmed, Z. S., & Bhatnagar, S. (2015). Conflict or cooperation? The role of India and Pakistan in post-2014 Afghanistan. *South Asian Studies*, 30(1), 259–276.
- Ahmed, Z. S., & Bhatnagar, S. (2018). The India-Iran-Pakistan triad: Comprehending the correlation of geo-economics and geopolitics. *Asian Studies Review*, 42(3), 517-536.
- Ahmed, Z. S., & Yousaf, F. (2018). Pashtun Jirgas, their potential in Pak-Afghan reconciliation and national reconstruction. *South Asia Research*, 38(1), 57-74.
- Akhtar, N. (2008). Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Taliban. *International Journal on World Peace*, 25(4), 49-73.
- Collis, J. & Hussey, R. (2003). *Business Research: A Practical Guide for Undergraduate and Postgraduate Students*. Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire.
- Financial Tribune. (2018, 8 April). Iran biggest trade partner of Afghanistan in 2017-2018. Retrieved from <https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-domestic-economy/84309/iran-biggest-trade-partnerof-afghanistan-in-2017-18>
- Gamba, A. (2009). Neighbors matter: Evidence on trade, growth and productivity. *Revista Economica*. Retrieved from <https://www.etsg.org/ETSG2009/papers/gamba.pdf>
- Grawert, E., Nusrat, R., & Shah, Z. A. (2017). *Afghanistan's cross-border trade with Pakistan and Iran and the responsibility for conflict-sensitive employment*. International Center for Conversion.
- Javaid, U. (2016). Analyzing the dynamics of Pakistan–Afghanistan relations: Past and present. *South Asian Studies*, 31(1), 137-147.
- Khan, F.H. (2003). *Rough Neighbors: Afghanistan and Pakistan*. Strategic Insight of Center for Contemporary Conflict. Retrieved from <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/archiveTopic.asp#southAsia> August 11, 2022.
- Khan, I & Shirazi, S.I. (2021). Geostrategic importance of Afghanistan for Pakistan. *Pakistan Geographical Review*, 76(1): 137-153.
- Khan, M. Z. (2017, March). Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan since Operation Freedom Sentinel: An overview. *Margalla Papers*, 105-119.
- Kumar, S. (2008). Pakistan-Afghanistan relations: Stabilizing politics through economics. *Strategic Analysis*, 32(2), 223-243.



- Latif, A. (2018, 9 March). Key trade route between Pakistan, Afghanistan reopens. *Anadolu Agency*. Retrieved from <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/key-trade-route-between-pakistan-afghanistanreopens/1084253>
- McNabb, E. D. (2005). *Research Methods for Political Science Quantitative and Qualitative Methods*. Prentice Hall of India, New Delhi.
- Miankhel, A. K. (2015). Channelizing Afghanistan to Pakistan informal trade into formal channels. *International Food Research Institute*. Retrieved from <http://ebrary.ifpri.org/utis/getfile/collection/p15738coll2/id/130321/filename/130532.pdf>
- Neuman, W. (2012). *Basics of Social Research*. (3rd Ed.) Boston: Pearson/Allyn and Bacon.
- Omrani, B. (2009). The Durand Line: History and problems of the Afghan–Pakistan border. *Asian Affairs*, 40(2), 177-195.
- Qassem, A. S. (2007). Afghanistan-Pakistan relations: Border controversies as counter-terrorist impediments. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 61(1), 65-80.
- Rais, R. B. (2019). Geopolitics on the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderland: An overview of different historical phases. *Geopolitics*, 24(2), 284-307.
- Ross, G. & Vassefi, T. (2015). *Violent Nonstate Actors in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Relationship: Historical Context and Future Prospects*, chapter 11 book Pakistan's Enduring Challenges. University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Taye, S., & Ahmed, Z. S. (2021). Dynamics of trust and mistrust in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Relationship. *Asian Studies Review*, 45(4), 557-575.
- Usman, T., & Khan, M. M. (2017). Pak-Afghan relations (2001-2017): A prisoner's dilemma analysis. *Strategic Studies*, 37(1), 1-17.
- Zeb, R. (2013). Pakistan and Afghanistan, 2014 and beyond: Not friends, not yet enemies? *Journal of South Asian Development*, 8(2), 165-183.
- Zingel, W. P. (2014). The economics of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations: Implications for the region. *India Quarterly*, 70(1), 1-14.

Submit your manuscript to MDPIP Open Access journal and benefit from:

- Convenient online submission
- Rigorous peer review
- Open access: articles freely available online
- High visibility within the field
- Retaining the copyright to your article

Submit your next manuscript at ➤ mdpip.com